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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to provide an overview of the trend or focus in the research of corporate governance in emerging countries with the aim to identify 
the gaps in the existing literature. The review notes that corporate governance research in emerging countries is dominated by economic perspective, 
in particular the agency theory, as researchers follow the strands of research conducted in the more advanced countries, especially the US and the 
UK. This paper argues that although influential, agency theory is unable to provide sufficient understanding on many issues related to practices for 
the fact that corporate governance is not happening in social vacuum; it is affected by various other institutional factors and local context. Hence, in 
order to gain better understanding of corporate governance in emerging countries, alternatives perspectives or theories, such as institutional theory, 
should be employed by the researchers.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to provide a commentary on the 
nature of existing research on corporate governance in emerging 
countries and to show how alternative theories are needed to gain 
deeper understanding of corporate governance in these economies. 
Corporate governance research in emerging countries is considered 
as relatively new as compared to those conducted in the more 
advanced economies. In the US, although corporate governance 
systems have long existed in their corporate world as evidenced 
by the work of Smith (1776) and Berle and Means (1932), the 
expression only started to appear in American law journals in the 
1970s. It was then imported to the UK and has become widely 
discussed in the last two decades in both countries (O’Sullivan, 
2000). By the late 1990s, it had become a major issue in all other 
advanced economies and, increasingly, in developing countries 
as well. Corporate governance became increasingly important 
in these developing countries due to privatisation, pension 
deregulation, free capital movement or capitalism globalization, 
market integration, and corporate scandals (Becht et al., 2005).
A review of existing literature on corporate governance in 
emerging countries suggests that they are mostly mirrored those 
conducted in the US and UK, focusing on the issue of agency 
problems. However, this paper argues that context matters; 
hence, research in emerging economies should utilize different 
theoretical perspectives in studying corporate governance 
due to the differences in their institutional contexts, politics, 
history, ownership structures, and other relevant factors. Agency 
theory is developed in the US and the UK due to their corporate 
structures characterised by the widely dispersed ownership. 
Emerging countries, however, do not share the same ownership 
structure. Hence, focusing only on agency theory would hamper 
the understanding of corporate governance practices in these 
economies.
This paper is structured as follows; the next section provides 
a brief discussion on various meanings of the term corporate 
governance. This is followed by a section that provides a review of 
corporate governance research in emerging economies. The focus 
is then shifted onto discussing the limitations of agency theory 
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when applied in the corporate governance research in emerging 
economies; followed by a concluding comment.
2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEFINED
Corporate governance is an ambiguous concept. Basically, there 
is no one generally accepted definition of corporate governance; it 
differs depending on an individual’s view of the world. Among the 
well accepted definitions developed by relevant institutions include 
the definition that “corporate governance as the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury Committee Report, 
1992); and corporate governance as a set of relationships between 
a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders that provides the structure through which the objectives 
of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives 
and monitoring performance are determined (The OECD, 2004).
Researchers define corporate governance according to their research 
perspectives. Schleifer and Vishny (1986), for example, looked at 
corporate governance from the agency theory perspective and 
defined it as “the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return to their investment.” However, 
Bradley et al., (1999) argue that corporate governance is more than 
simply the relationship between a firm and its capital providers. 
The broadest definition of corporate governance is given by Blair 
(1995. p. 3), who sees corporate governance as referring to “the 
whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that 
determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls 
them, how that control is exercised, and how the risks and returns 
from the activities they undertake are allocated.” The following 
section discusses corporate governance research and adoption of 
codes of best practices in emerging countries.
3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
EMERGING ECONOMIES
Historically, corporate governance research could be said to 
be originated from the US. The concern related to corporate 
governance in the US has existed for many decades ever since 
joint stock companies moved into the mainstream of global 
economy; particularly with the issues of inefficiency and corporate 
failures (Smith, 1776). An influential work by Berle and Means 
(1932) revealed that, despite their benefits the structure of modern 
companies in the US, characterised by a separation of ownership 
and control, had engendered a situation where the true owners 
of companies, the shareholders, had little influence over the 
companies’ management. They wrote that:
 “The separation of ownership from control produces a 
condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate 
manager may, and often do, diverge, and where many of the 
checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power 
disappear”
(1932. p. 6).
This situation formed the basis of the agency problem, where 
managers may not act in the best interest of owners due to 
differences in motivations. Principals, therefore, struggle to 
control and monitor the activities of the agents. The study by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) then shed light as to how companies 
could survive this agency issue. Since then, research on corporate 
governance has flourished in the US with agency theory been 
dominating the field.
It was only in the 90s that research utilizing non-US data started 
to appear; labelled as the first generation and second generation 
of research (Denis and McConnell, 2003). The first generation 
of research refers to those patterned after the US research that 
preceded it, in particular, board composition and equity ownership. 
Research efforts had started in three advanced economies, i.e., UK, 
Germany, and Japan; followed by other advanced economies, 
especially in Europe. The second generation of research considers 
the possible impact of differing legal systems on the structure 
and effectiveness of corporate governance and compares systems 
across countries. The attention to legal systems in corporate 
governance studies begins with the study conducted by La 
Porta et al. (1998), which investigates how the existence of laws 
protecting investors and the quality of enforcement of the laws 
determine corporate ownership patterns in a country. Research in 
emerging economies follows the first generation strand; appearing 
after other advanced economies. Therefore, these researches 
mirrored those conducted in the US and the UK, focusing on the 
issue of agency problems.
At the national level, corporate governance in emerging countries 
started to become important when they were experiencing changes 
in their domestic economies, which have led them to undertake 
market-oriented economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. This 
saw them implement widespread privatization, liberalization of 
economies, as well as expanding market institutions, such as 
the stock markets. However, the 1997/1998 Asian crisis, as well 
as few other crises in other emerging economies, allegedly due 
to weaknesses in their corporate governance systems, had then 
made corporate governance not only a national concern for these 
countries, but also a concern at the international level due to its 
spill-over effects (Singh, 2003). Adoption of codes of corporate 
governance from the Anglo-Saxon system became widespread. 
Attention then led to increasing research being conducted post-
Asian crises, as more resources were being outlaid by international 
financial organizations to finance research in these economies.
Review of corporate governance literature in emerging economies 
shows few streams of research been conducted in these countries. 
One stream of research has been focusing on corporate governance 
mechanisms from the agency theory perspective including studies 
on privatization and agency issues (Dharwadkar et al., 2000); 
the role of ownership structure and investor protection in post-
privatization companies (Boubakri et al., 2005); shareholder 
activism (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000); and comparative studies of 
ownership structure and firms’ performance (Claessens and Fan, 
2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003). Another stream of research 
focuses on the adoption of the corporate governance codes of best 
practices by the emerging economies from the more developed 
nations, in particular, the Anglo-Saxon system (Young et al., 2008; 
Singh et al., 2005; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). There 
are also works that have focused on government intervention 
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(Boubakri et al., 2005; Fan et al., 2011). Government intervention 
is one of the key institutional forces in emerging markets that 
impact upon the structures and behaviours of firms (Fan et al., 
2011).
The review of corporate governance literature above shows that 
although attention has later been directed towards institutions, 
these studies are still based on agency theory perspective which 
focuses on corporate governance as mechanisms to address the 
agency conflicts. There appears to be lack of studies utilizing 
institutional perspective and gives evidence on how various 
institutions constraint corporate governance actors’ actions. The 
next section provides some arguments on why agency theory is 
not sufficient to study corporate governance in emerging countries.
4. A CRITIQUE OF AGENCY THEORY
The flaws of agency theory in explaining corporate governance 
mechanisms, in general, are noted by Professor Victor Brudney 
(1985) when he argues against the analysis that claims that 
private bargaining or contract sufficiently restraints management 
misbehaviour. Acknowledging instead on the importance of 
institutions, he argues that:
 “Scattered stockholders lack the requisite information and 
institutional mechanisms either to bargain over the terms 
of management’s employment, or to monitor and control 
management’s activities. The “markets” for managers and for 
securities do not effectively implement investor constraints on 
management. Outside directors are insufficiently independent 
from management to serve as agents for stock-holders in 
selecting or controlling management, and too many factors, 
and possibly information imperfections, affect the price 
of stock for it to serve as mechanism for effective investor 
impact upon managerial performance.… realistic inquiry 
into the operation of institutional factors affecting corporate 
governance is required before accepting approaches which 
are based on the rhetoric of “contract” and agency costs and 
reject the need for “government intervention”
(Brudney, 1985. p. 1403).
His argument is not in isolation as Roe (1991) also found that the 
initial separation of ownership and control in the US, at least in 
the 1930s, was because of legal and political factors; and not as an 
automatic response to the development of their firms. Criticizing 
agency theory also, Van Essen (2011) looks at the role of ownership 
in different contexts by taking into account the different formal 
and informal institutional constellations found in those contexts. 
He found that who owns the firms matter for the firms’ strategies, 
objectives, and performance; i.e., a crucial factor with respect 
to the ownership concentration, firm strategy and performance 
relationships, is owner identity. While Van Essen (2011) has been 
investigating ownership from institutional perspective, his focus 
is on the role of ownership and not about how the ownership 
structure is shaped.
In relation to studies of board of directors also, although agency 
theory has been dominating corporate governance literature, it 
is however, claimed to provide very little information regarding 
actual board functioning and behaviour (Petrovic, 2008) and 
hence a call for greater theoretical pluralism and more detailed 
attention to board processes and dynamics (Roberts et al., 2005). 
They suggest that it is the actual conduct of the directors that 
determine board effectiveness; while board structure, composition, 
and independence only condition it. Turley and Zaman (2007) 
found that the most significant effects of the audit committee on 
governance occur outside the formal structure and processes. This 
is consistent with earlier observation that corporate governance 
is social process, hence, should also be investigated from social 
perspective.
Aguilera et al. (2008) challenged agency perspective and termed 
it as “closed system.” They propose an organizational sociology 
approach to comparative corporate governance to better capture 
the patterned variation that results from interdependencies between 
firms and their environment. Their “open system” perspective 
view corporate governance in terms of effectiveness in achieving 
their goals. They adopt a much broader definition of effectiveness 
as opposed to agency theory and their proposed framework is 
comprehensive for assessing how institutional context affects the 
appropriateness of alternative governance process.
The adoption of codes of corporate governance developed in the 
Anglo-Saxon system by emerging economies have also been 
questioned by many as they argued that there exist institutional 
differences in these markets which should not be ignored in 
making corporate governance policies. Emerging markets 
normally have weak market for corporate control or different 
capital market structure (Singh et al., 2005) as well as relatively 
weaker institutions including corporate governance institutions 
(Gugler et al., 2003). Different institutions create different 
governance issues; and these differences affect the implementation 
of corporate governance recommendations (for example, Gibson, 
2003). Hence, using policies designed for developed economies 
may prove ineffective or even counter-productive in emerging 
economies (Young et al., 2008). The utilization of agency theory 
is also questioned.
The codes of best practices found in the Anglo-American system 
are developed based on agency theory which means that the 
codes are developed based on the premise that the main corporate 
governance problem is self-interested management and weak, 
dispersed shareholders. This empirical context is in fact highly 
unrepresentative when taken outside the US and the UK since 
most firms in the world have a dominant owner. In fact, high 
concentrated ownership is a feature of publicly listed companies in 
emerging economies (Fan and Wong, 2005); where family or state 
holds a dominant stake (Berglof and Thadden, 1999; Claessens 
et al., 1999). The organizational activities in emerging economies 
can differ considerably from those found in developed economies 
(Wright et al., 2005) and corporate governance problems in this 
economies may require different solutions from those generated 
from agency theory perspective (e.g., Lubatkin et al., 2005). High 
concentrated ownership means firms could also face principal-
principal conflict, i.e., conflicts between majority shareholders 
who dominate the board, and minority shareholders (Young 
et al., 2008). It also induces agency problems when tight control 
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allows controlling shareholders’ self-dealings to go unchallenged 
internally by boards of directors or externally by takeover markets 
(Fan and Wong, 2005).
The implications of these institutional differences are many; for 
example, the cost of capital in these markets is higher due to their 
relatively weak institutions (Young et al., 2008). Fan and Wong 
(2005) argues that in emerging markets, the agency conflicts 
between controlling owners and the minority shareholders are 
difficult to mitigate through conventional corporate control 
mechanisms including board of directors. Hence, in these economies 
the Big 5 auditors plays a corporate governance role as evidenced 
by the fact that Big 5 auditors do take into consideration their 
clients’ agency problems when making audit fee and audit report 
decisions as well as the evidence that firms hiring Big 5 auditors 
receive smaller share price discounts associated with the agency 
conflicts. Millar et al. (2005) posit that the relationship-based 
corporate governance of Asia’s emerging market is characterized 
by government’s orientation towards providing subsidized credit 
to firms in targeted industrial sectors and implicitly sharing the 
risk which acted against institutional transparency. The allegedly 
weaker corporate governance institutions in emerging economies 
relative to advanced countries also explain the differences in the 
sources of finance for investment across countries and differences 
in the returns on investment (Gugler et al., 2003).
Hoskisson et al. (2000) observe that despite being the most 
applicable paradigm for explaining firm’s behaviour in emerging 
economies, the number of theoretical and empirical studies 
utilizing an institutional perspective in such context is limited. 
Such need for the focus on institutions is because emerging 
economies are still heavily regulated which means there are 
institutional influences. For example, the state-owned-enterprises 
are affected by government institutions, and at the same time, other 
private firms would also be influenced by institutional environment 
such as cultural and political.
From institutional perspective, corporate governance is a 
secondary institution influenced by much larger institutional 
and social forces. Understanding those forces would help in 
understanding corporate governance not as a mechanism dealing 
with agency issues but also seeing corporate governance as a 
political as well as social instrument.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper argues that corporate governance research in emerging 
economies is dominated by agency theory perspective. While 
agency theory is important in explaining corporate governance 
in these economies, this paper argues that it is not sufficient. 
Alternative perspectives are needed in explaining the practice of 
corporate governance in emerging economies more holistically 
as emerging economies have different institutional context and 
non-economic factors as compared to more advanced economies. 
In doing so, this paper reviews corporate governance literature, 
focusing on those studies conducted in emerging economies, with 
the purpose to provide a detailed commentary on the nature of 
existing research on corporate governance in these economies and 
identify gaps in this literature. This paper proceeds by explaining on 
why agency theory is not sufficient and suggests for future work.
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